Is the difference between compatibilists and incompatibilists only their different standards of evidence for the term "Free Will"? Also is reason and logic compatible with determinism revised.

Hello everyone,

Again, I welcome all thoughts and criticism as I would like to be corrected whenever I am wrong about something.

With regard to my first question "Is the difference between compatibilists and incompatibilists only their different standards of evidence". I am asking this question as I find myself agreeing with compatibilists when it comes to certain issues, but I still don't think this constitutes free will.

The late Daniel Dennett, as far as I understand him, seemed to argue that free will is something that is equivalent to self-regulation. It is "an achievement" as he puts it. In other words, if you can behave yourself, by acting within the spectrum of normal human behaviour, then you have free will. Well of course most people can behave within the normal spectrum of human behaviour, but that says absolutely nothing about what is truly pulling the levers and is causing your behaviour, which is absolutely everything that came before the behaviour from the beginning of the universe. I would guess that most incompatibilists would agree that most people can self-regulate and behave within the normal spectrum of behaviour, I don't think this constitutes free will. Is the difference between compatibilists and incompatibilists merely competing definitions of free will?

I was also told that because I can imagine multiple scenarios and choose whatever one I like, that this means I have free choice. Well of course I can imagine multiple scenarios in my head, but ultimately the one I pick will have been determined from the moment of the big bang, albeit with perhaps some randomness thrown in there. I don't think this constitutes free will. Is again the difference between compatibilists and incompatibilists there competing definitions of free will? Couldn't I just chose to define free will as self-regulation and the ability to imagine multiple possible scenarios and boom I have free will? Is this what compatibilists do?

I made an earlier post surrounding the topic "Is reason and logic compatible with determinism" and I had many great responses. I think I have come to believe that reason is definitely on some level compatible with determinism as reason is all something we engage in. It is a deterministic faculty similar to eye-sight that still works regardless.

However, I can't help but think that because whatever view points I have will be determined from the moment of the big bang, that this somehow undermines reason. If what separates one philosopher from the next is a series of deterministic circumstances, I just feel that this undermines reason on some level. Do any philosophers or LFWers make this case? Aren't the determinants of our world view our deterministic circumstances rather than our use of reason? Or is it both? Again, perhaps this is a definitional issue or I just have too high of a standard as to what constitutes reason, in a similar way to the compatibilist and incompatibilist debate.

Any of your thoughts and criticisms are much appreciated.